Mössner S.  Cosa rimane dai Programmi di Sviluppo Integrato? Esperienze il "Contratto di Quartiere" a Milano e la "Soziale Stadt" a Francoforte

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1. Introduction

Since the early 1990s European cities have increasingly focussed on a sustainable urban development (Astleithner & Hamedinger, 2003; Atkinson & Carmichael, 2007). Economic restructuring on the global scale has led to a new dramaturgy of social needs at the local level. The interrelatedness of political action on all scales and continuous processes of re-scaling (Brenner, 1997) have drawn back the political attention to the geography of the local and the specificity of space (Meegan & Mitchell, 2001). As a result area-based approaches to local development re-attract political administrations in all European cities. This new attraction brings disadvantaged communities back into the spotlight of the political agenda.

In the very centre of area-based programmes, housing, economic and social policies are merged into an integrated approach bringing together new actors from different backgrounds. Generally, the concept of integration can be defined as a combination of a spatially integrative perspective and new forms of urban governance, through which political actors can build new and enlarge existing capacities to act (Fürst, Lahner, et al., 2004). Integrated development programmes are considered as “learning systems” (Franke & Strauss, 2010) within which the solution to local problems is subject to a permanent search of the most adequate way. This idea of the ‘un-planned planning’ is central to a complex planning system that tries to respond to ambiguous problems such as social exclusion by complex multi-actor constellations (Balducci, 2004). The main characteristic of these new constellations is a stronger orientation towards (inter- and extra-sectorial) co-operation processes (Vicari Haddock, 2004), which are embedded into an environment of informality, uncertainty and risk (Mössner, 2010).

On May 27th 2007 the European Union passed the “Leipzig-Charta” for sustainable urban development (BMVBS, 2007; Eltges & Hamann, 2010). Within this European Charta, the local implementation of integrated policy approaches to urban development and new forms of urban governance were officially declared as explicit political goals at the European level.
Integrated development programmes have been implemented in most European cities since more than a decade (Dikec, 2006; Donzelot, 2007; Günther, 2007; Mössner, 2010; Parkinson, 2007; Walther & Günther, 2007). Only few voices were asking for the possible risks and implications of these “communicative planning tools” (Bischoff, Selle, et al., 2007; Selle, 2007), taking into account the consequences of informality and the new importance of trust (Mössner, 2010).

Based on empirical findings gathered between 2005 and 2008 in Milan and Frankfurt, this paper approaches integrated development programmes by focussing on trust between actors involved into the integrated development programmes. Following a neo-institutional perspective, non-reflected scripts, informal routines and the taken-for-grantedness stand in the very centre of this study (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hasse & Krücken, 2009; Scott, 2001).

2. A neo-institutional approach to integrated development programmes

Since the publication of urban sociologist Peter Saunders (Saunders, 1979) it is common sense that political power at the local level is based on both formal as well as informal institutions. Centralized hierarchical power is continuously challenged, supplemented or partly replaced by non-legitimized partnerships and informal governance coalitions. Integrated development programmes are important tools of institutionalizing such informal decision-making processes within which individual resources are decisive for success or failure. It seems to be obvious that informal institutions play a crucial role for understand these programmes. How can we analyse these informal institutions?

Drawn on the literature of north-American organizational theory, integrated development programmes can be understood as organizational entities. The neo-institutionalism “takes a deductive approach that starts from theoretical propositions about the way institutions work“ (Lowndes, 2009) and seems to be rather appropriate to understand governance coalitions. According to Senge (Senge, 2006), institutions are defined as social rules, which are stable in terms of time, binding in terms of social reliability and decisive in substance. In the very centre of neo-institutionalism are institutions that are “non-reflected routines and scripts” (Scott, 2001), which are taken-for-granted and not subject to rational decisions.

Formal and informal institutions can mutually co-exist and they determine collective and individual acting (Senge & Hellmann, 2006).
Integrated urban development programmes, such as the case studies of the Milanese “Contratti di Quartiere” and the Frankfurt programme “Soziale Stadt – Aktive Nachbarschaften”, follow a European tradition of territorial interventions in so-called deprived neighbourhoods (Jacquier, 2005). As a political instrument they are output of new governance, establishing new modes of coordination among public and private actors. Both programmes realize material as well as procedural goals (Astleithner & Hamedinger, 2003). On the material side we find capital-intensive investments into housing infrastructures as well as non-investive measures to foster social cohesion in the neighbourhood. The procedural side of the programmes refers to finding, exploring and testing adequate governance constellations to realize this material output. Governance can be broadly defined as a “mode of coordination in which the aim is to control, guide or facilitate economic and social activities distributed across the landscape, including activities involved in transforming nature” (Jonas & While, 2005). Governance means social complexity (Kooiman, 2006). Trust is an excellent mode to reduce social complexity enabling actors to act within complex planning systems. As “(t)rust responds to the uncertainty in our relation to others” (Tonkiss, 2004), the complementary to trust can be found in formal arrangements, that build certainty through formal contracts, formally regulated actions, sanctions, clearly defined social roles and routines or well established obligations. From a neo-institutional perspective, focussing on the unintended and non-reflected routines of doing Governance means to focus on trust. There is interpersonal and institutional trust (Rus & Iglič, 2005). Institutional trust is based on commonly shared arrangements, broadly accepted roles that are taken-for-granted and routines that are relatively resistant against short-term changes.

3. A contract for a new political culture? The Milanese “Contratti di Quartiere II”

The Contratti di Quartiere are based on a national law proposed by the Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure. Although the Contratti di Quartiere are a national policy, compared to other Italian regions, the Lombard version is quite particular and diverse in terms of implementation and content (Regione Lombardia, 2003). Due to the region’s high percentage of co-financing, there was relatively great liberty in formulating and influencing the content of the programme, adapting it to the particular needs of the Region of Lombardy. The capital of the Region of Lombardy, the City of Milan, proposed five neighbourhoods for the tender procedure of the Contratti di Quartiere II and by doing so, for the first time, the City of Milan was going to implement a serious, city-wide integrated strategy to tackle social
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What at the first glance seemed to be a supra-ideological strategy overcoming long lasting
conflicts, witnessed a difficult and problematic situation in the middle of 2007. As a result,
the programme nearly collapsed and came to halt due to personal conflicts of differing interest
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According to the Region’s “desire to coordinate” (Jacquier, 2005), in the very centre of the
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And even more concrete: “The economic resources the nation state provided are seen as an
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During the interviews with representatives of the Region of Lombardy it became clear that the motivation for starting the new programme was less on the material side, than a reform on the procedural side of doing policies. On lower administrative levels, and particularly within the Milanese administration, this perspective has never been shared. At the beginning of the programme we can find a rather small, but important conflict between the administration levels about the purpose of the intervention.

Within the design of the Contratti there was particularly one aspect, which seemed to be rather useful for the Region to obtain this new political “culture of co-operation”: the integration of social aspects, including participatory planning elements. These aspects have been instrumentalized right from the beginning. Not only the Region of Lombardy, but also other actors have burden the Contratti di Quartiere with procedural objectives. There was latent skepticism all around leading to a relatively low level of institutional trust.

At the beginning of the Contratti di Quartiere II these latent conflicts were relatively masked, hidden by a widespread optimism and a very constructive atmosphere of searching new ways for realizing this great chance of changing the peripheries – a long durée desire among Italian urbanists. The City of Milan had implemented a department “Peripheries” that was consequently in charge of realizing the Contratti di Quartiere II. There was a relatively vital exchange of information between the actors involved into the programme. The formal structures of the department Peripheries created a relatively high degree of certainty among the actors based on inter-personal trust relations.

The steering group of the department Peripheries was considered as a “knot in the network”, supervising other actors, such as the owner of the housing stock ALER and the newly implemented neighbourhood-laboratories (Laboratorio di Quartiere). The laboratories have been managed by five private consulting agencies in charge of realizing the local participation process at the neighborhood level. Along these relatively hierarchical structures, the actors created a network based on interpersonal relations. Up to that point, the Contratti di Quartiere could be understood as a relatively stable structure, build on the one hand upon strong, paternalistic and hierarchical modes of coordination, on the other hand on informal trust relations.

This situation changed dramatically after the election of a new mayor of the City of Milan. Consequently, the internal structure of the City of Milan has been subject of a profound transformation including all sectors and departments. The department “Peripheries” was dissolved and replaced by the department “Territorial Development”. Due to destruction of personal relations the programme practically did no longer work.
4. In the shadow of the “Socially Integrative City” in Frankfurt

In the year 1999, the new elected national German government launched a joint integrated development programme called “Districts with Special Development Needs – The Socially Integrative City”. Along with this national urban policy, in few German cities local spin-offs have been established, adapting the standards of integrated approaches set by the national programme. These local spin-offs reproduce the national programme but lack its complex structure due to the disenrollment of national and regional agencies. The Frankfurt programme is particular applicable for empirical studies focussing on the unintended consequences and non-reflected routines, yet it remains quite comparable to other programmes. The Frankfurt programme includes material as well as procedural aspects of an integrative approach. But in contrast to the national “sister-programme”, only non-investive and social measures are realized. The upgrading of urban infrastructures does not play an important role within the programme.

The Frankfurt programme started in 2000 based on the personal initiative of former head of the City’s Social Security Department. The Frankfurt programme was launched in four to five neighbourhoods for a fixed period of only four years (Stadt Frankfurt am Main, 2007). Until today the programme have been realized in 18 neighbourhoods.

In the centre of the programme there is a “neighbourhood management”. Differently to the Italian experience not private companies but only well-established non-profit welfare organizations were assigned with the participation process in the programme in Frankfurt. In Frankfurt, the “neighbourhood management” has been assigned to only the largest welfare organizations: the union-associated Arbeiterwohlführung (AWO), the catholic Caritasverband (Caritas), the protestant Diakonische Werk (Diakonie), and the rather independent Internationale Bund (IB). It is the neighbourhood management’s task to foster co-operation of local and voluntary initiatives in the neighbourhood and to promote inhabitant’s participation.

In order to unmask the non-reflected institutions within the Frankfurt programme I will highlight two situations more in detail: the selection process of the neighbourhood management organizations and the process of negotiating between the few welfare organizations.

The selection process of the neighbourhood-management can be described as rather intransparent. The former head of the City’s Department for Social Security explained the
process as follows: “We didn’t publish a public call for tender at the beginning, because we didn’t want to have commercial agencies in the neighbourhood management. There are many officially accredited welfare organizations here. And four, five or six of them came into consideration. So, we all sat together at the table and I asked them: ‘how can we do that?’.

Because these welfare organizations already worked at the local level for a long time, so that we, the City, let them to decide. Everything worked great” (Interview, Frankfurt 2007). This statement points out that the City administration had neither really decided about which neighbourhood should have been involved into the programme, nor did they exactly know what to do in these neighbourhoods: “When we were all sitting together again […] the welfare organizations proposed some neighbourhoods and communities that seemed to be appropriate for such an intervention. Because they know it better than we do. And then we made a list of priorities and I asked them: ‘who wants take this neighbourhood and who wants rather that one’? I’d describe it as a rather open process. And at the end, we signed the contracts” (Interview, Frankfurt 2007).

What is described as an “open process” was in fact out of public awareness. Other actors had never a chance to apply for the neighbourhood management and the local inhabitants could not participate. Being asked why the City of Frankfurt has chosen such a closed procedure, the former Head of the City’s Department was relating to the benefit of inter-personal trust relations: “Well, Frankfurt is in fact a rather small city. Everyone knows everybody. And, let’s take the Caritas or the Diakonie for example. These are very qualified services. The director of the Caritas for example is a friend of mine, I know him for a long time. And he’s now personally responsible to me, and the City. […] I’ve always preferred rather non bureaucratic and less complicated ways.” (Interview, Frankfurt 2007).

The importance of personal relations becomes clear by looking at the welfare organizations negotiating about the neighbourhoods: “There are the four organizations: the AWO, the IB, the Caritas and the Diakonie. No one else. At no point there was competition among us. At the beginning we were maybe competing about the neighbourhoods, but finally we came to an agreement after a maximum of ten minutes. The AWO gets the Atzelberg-Sieldung (name of a neighbourhood in Frankfurt) and the Diakonie gets Rödelheim. No problem.” (Interview AWO, Frankfurt 2007).

While at the beginning of the programme the City of Frankfurt was still present yet inactive during the decision-process, after some time the City administration has completely withdrawn. Consequently, the welfare organizations started to negotiate independently about the neighbourhoods. The City of Frankfurt only accredited once made decisions: “The City
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5. Doing Governance – with or without trust

The situation of the Contratti di Quartiere II in Milan in the year 2007/08 can be summarized as following: First, there was institutional competition between the Municipality and the Region regarding the establishment of a “political culture”. Second, informal structures between the local actors collapsed, because there was no longer stability behind them. Third, the “new hierarchy” of the “heads of the network” was in fact a rather semantic change, because the new department’s staff was withdrawing from decision processes so that time for decisions was extended. At the end, the Contratti di Quartiere II (in 2007) were an example of de-hierarchization and de-politization. Even though at the beginning the level of interpersonal trust was relatively high, institutional trust was completely lacking.

The Frankfurt case comes to a rather similar result: the “socially-integrative city”-programme in Frankfurt should be considered as a metaphor for a new political culture of informality. On the one hand, the City withdraws from responsibility. While interpersonal trust was very effective at the beginning, also institutional trust was taking place and became the even more important co-operation mechanism during the programme. It remains questionable whether policy-approaches that are establishing informal environments at the local level, are really appropriate to guarantee a sustainable development, as claimed by the European commission in the Leipzig-Charta.

6. Reference


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While at the beginning of the programme the City of Frankfurt was still present yet inactive during the decision-process, after some time the City administration has completely withdrawn. Consequently, the welfare organizations started to negotiate independently about the neighbourhoods. The City of Frankfurt only accredited once made decisions: “The City
administration was providing the financial resources and was then choosing a very simple way: ‘Get yourselves together and come to an agreement!’ And that’s what we did. And there was also a public tender process. On a European level, but it was clear that these neighbourhoods remain among us. It’s better to work with local, competent partners.” (Interview Caritas, Frankfurt 2007)

5. Doing Governance – with or without trust

The situation of the Contratti di Quartiere II in Milan in the year 2007/08 can be summarized as following: First, there was institutional competition between the Municipality and the Region regarding the establishment of a “political culture”. Second, informal structures between the local actors collapsed, because there was no longer stability behind them. Third, the “new hierarchy” of the “heads of the network” was in fact a rather semantic change, because the new department’s staff was withdrawing from decision processes so that time for decisions was extended. At the end, the Contratti di Quartiere II (in 2007) were an example of de-hierarchization and de-politization. Even though at the beginning the level of interpersonal trust was relatively high, institutional trust was completely lacking.

The Frankfurt case comes to a rather similar result: the “socially-integrative city”-programme in Frankfurt should be considered as a metaphor for a new political culture of informality. On the one hand, the City withdraws from responsibility. While interpersonal trust was very effective at the beginning, also institutional trust was taking place and became the even more important co-operation mechanism during the programme. It remains questionable whether policy-approaches that are establishing informal environments at the local level, are really appropriate to guarantee a sustainable development, as claimed by the European commission in the Leipzig-Charta.

6. Reference


